Greg Detre
Monday, 01 October, 2001
Is it Hume's view that morality is a system of hypothetical imperatives?
'Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions' (HUME). Would it follow from this that morality is irrational?
Is Hume a utilitarian?
'Morality is ... more properly felt than judg'd of ...' (HUME). Discuss.
Is Hume's view of the relationship between reason and morality more acceptable than Kant's view?
'By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains' (HUME). Does this solve the problem of free will?
Does 'ought' imply 'can'?
'Mill's "proof" of utilitarianism is the best argument for utilitarianism that there is'. Discuss.
Is it an objection to a consequentialist theory that it cannot be used as a guide to action?
'If there were a fire where five people will die unless you save them at the cost of your own life, morality does not require you to save them'. Do you agree?
In what sense, if any, is consequentialism alienating?
What role does pleasure play in well-being?
Is Hume a utilitarian?
On what kind of basis could one judge whether it is morally better to be a consequentialist or to be a deontologist?
'Since utilitarians hold that justice can be subordinated to overall utility, utilitarianism is morally unacceptable.' Discuss.
'The feeling of sympathy and warmhearted fellow-feeling ... is burdensome even to right-thinking persons, confusing their considered maxims and creating the wish to be free from them and subject only to law-giving reason' (KANT). Is Kant right to say this?
Is the imperative that one never treat a rational being as a means only, but always also as an end, just another way of representing the requirement that one act only on those maxims which one can will to be universal laws?
'Nothing in the world can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good will' (KANT). Elucidate and discuss.
Is Kant right that we may never treat humanity simply as a means?
'Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure. Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person. To this the answer is given: Surely, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely, And then with aversion do what your duty enjoins you' (SCHILLER). Is this an accurate reflection of Kant's views on moral worth?
Is Hume's view of the relationship between reason and morality more acceptable than Kant's view?
Is it Hume's view that morality is a system of hypothetical imperatives?
'Beings ... whose existence depends ... on nature ... have ... if they are non-rational beings, only a relative value as means and are consequently called things. Rational beings, on the other hand, are called persons because their nature already marks them out as ends-in-themselves - that is, as something which ought not to be used merely as a means ...' (KANT). Discuss.
'Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law' (KANT). What does this mean? Is it true?
Can the right and the good be defined in terms of what a virtuous agent would do?
Is singlemindedness a virtue?
Who is better - the moral saint, or the moral hero?
'The considerations to which a virtuous person is sensitive are more fundamental than the virtues themselves.' Is this true? If so, is the project of 'virtue ethics' doomed?
'Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure. Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not a virtuous person. To this the answer is given: Surely, your only resource is to try to despise them entirely, And then with aversion do what your duty enjoins you' (SCHILLER). Is this an accurate reflection of Kant's views on moral worth?
'I did it because it was my duty.' 'I did it because the virtue of charity required it.' 'I did it because they were hungry.' Which of these statements best represents the virtuous person's reason for performing a charitable action?
Are the virtues more than desirable habits?
Does any freedom it is worth having require that determinism is not true?
'I am not ultimately responsible for what I am. So how can I be responsible for what I do?' Discuss.
'A person is responsible for any act that can be ascribed to his or her will; whether the will was free or not is immaterial.' Discuss.
'By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains' (HUME). Does this solve the problem of free will?
Can there be duties without rights or rights without duties?
How might a deontologist explain why it is wrong for me to kill another person, even if that is the only way to prevent two or more killings by others?
How should someone who believes in human rights decide what humans have rights to?
In what sense, if any, is human life 'sacred'?
On what kind of basis could one judge whether it is morally better to be a consequentialist or to be a deontologist?
'To say that there are such things as human rights is simply to say that there are certain things which should not be done to human beings. So we could dispense with rights talk in favour of talk about negative obligations, and moral discourse would be none the poorer.' Discuss.
'Since utilitarians hold that justice can be subordinated to overall utility, utilitarianism is morally unacceptable.' Discuss.
What is wrong with treating people unequally?
Could there be a right to be loved?
What, if anything, should a society try to make equal?
Is the duty not to harm more stringent than the duty to benefit?
'Moral experience presents moral values as being objective, or real'. Does this put any constraints on what could be an adequate moral theory?
'Moral relativism is the moral theory which best supports toleration of others' moral views'. Discuss.
In what ways is morality relative?
Is the fact that people's moral judgements motivate them a problem for believers in moral objectivity?
In what sense, if any, are moral judgements universal?
'The ordinary person does not, unless corrupted by philosophy, believe that he creates values by his choices. He thinks that some things really are better than others and that he is capable of getting it wrong' (IRIS MURDOCH). Discuss.
Could moral judgements be both objective and subjective?
In what sense, if any, is human life 'sacred'?
'... when an amoralist ... suggests that there is no reason to follow the requirements of morality, what can we say to him?' (WILLIAMS). What can we say?
If there were no beings with desires or preferences, could anything be of any value?
Can the right and the good be defined in terms of what a virtuous agent would do?
'Nothing in the world can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good will' (KANT). Elucidate and discuss.
Is it possible sincerely to judge an act to be right and not be motivated to perform it?
'If an action is my action, then its motive is my motive. Thus all motivation is self-regarding'. Does this argument exclude the possibility of truly altruistic action?
'If there were a fire where five people will die unless you save them at the cost of your own life, morality does not require you to save them'. Do you agree?
'Man would like to be an egoist but cannot. This is the most striking characteristic of his wretchedness and the source of his greatness' (SIMONE WEIL). Discuss.
Could there be such a thing as ethical egoism?
Is it possible sincerely to judge an act to be right and not be motivated to perform it?
'Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions' (HUME). Would it follow from this that morality is irrational?
Is the fact that people's moral judgements motivate them a problem for believers in moral objectivity?
Is Hume's view of the relationship between reason and morality more acceptable than Kant's view?
Could a genealogy of our moral beliefs provide us with reasons to change those beliefs?
What role does pleasure play in well-being?
In what sense, if any, is human life 'sacred'?
Would one's having continuous feelings of well-being be sufficient for one's well-being?
'The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values' (NIETZSCHE). What light, if any, does this shed upon present-day moral thinking?
'When Nietzsche speaks of moving "beyond good and evil", he does not mean beyond morality, but merely beyond what he condemns as slave morality.' Discuss.
'... when an amoralist ... suggests that there is no reason to follow the requirements of morality, what can we say to him?' (WILLIAMS). What can we say?
Could a genealogy of our moral beliefs provide us with reasons to change those beliefs?
Is there any basis for the claim that we have a greater moral obligation to help those near to us than to help those who are distant? If so, what is it? If not, why not?
In what sense, if any, is consequentialism alienating?
Are we morally responsible for what we believe?
Leaving corpses wrapped in brown paper in dirty rooms in hospitals strikes us with horror, but is it wrong?
'Moral ideals do not, and need not, make the best personal ideals' (SUSAN WOLF). Is this claim coherent?
Does the notion of 'moral intuition' have a place in ethical theory?
'Equality matters.' 'We should give priority to the worse off.' 'We should be compassionate.' Compare and contrast these views.
What is the point of repentance?
Who is better - the moral saint, or the moral hero?
Is any form of ethical naturalism defensible?
Could someone else judge the quality of your life better than you could?
Is it right to think that however well people behave, they ought to behave still better if they can?
Is punishment a kind of payment?
Should prostitution be regarded as just one more service industry?
Does genetic engineering pose a threat to human dignity?
virtue theory
free will
amoralism + moral facts
consequentialism
Williams � Ethics and the limits of philosophy
Singer � Companion to Ethics
�� when an amoralist �
suggests that there is no reason to follow the requirements of morality, what
can we say to him?� (Williams) What can we say?
What do emotivists get
right?
Are there any moral
facts?
John McDowell � �Values and Secondary qualities� in Honderich (ed) �Morality and Objectivity�
Simon Blackburn � �Spreading the word�, ch 6
David McNaughton
Gilbert Harman
David Wiggins
Thomas Nagel � �View from Nowhere;, ch 8
John Mackie � �Ethics�, ch 1
Does any form of
consequentialism escape fatal criticism?
John Stuart Mill � Utilitarianism
David Ross � The Right and the Good, ch 2
Samuel Scheffler
Jonathan Dancy � Moral Reasons, ch 13
Derek Parfit � Reasons and Persons, sections 10-18, 24-29
Peter Singer
Does Kant satisfactorily explain why we should not make
false promises?
Kant � Groundwork ch 1 + 2
Onora Nell (O�Neill) � Acting on Principle ch 5
Onora O�Neill � �Kant�s ethics� in Companion to ethics, Singer (ed)
Bernard Williams � Ethics and the limits of philosophy, ch 4
What role should the notion of �virtue� play in ethics?
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, book 1 ch 7, book 2
Roger Crisp, �Modern moral philosophy
and the virtues�, in Crisp (ed) How should one live?
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, chs 5, 15
Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (eds)
Virtue ethics
Elizabeth Anscombe, �Modern moral philosophy�, Philosophy 1958
Philippa Foot, �Virtues and vices� in Virtues and vices, or ch 1
Rosalind Hursthouse, in Virtue ethics (eds Crisp and Slote)
If determinism is true, can anyone be held morally
responsible?
Inwagen, �Incompatability of free will� in Watson (ed), Free Will
Strawson, �Freedom and resentment�
finish with steve +
sarah's notes
look at decrees
look over frankfurt
notes
look at inwagen
article
look over essays
look over
papers/articles
look at notes: foot
(nathaniel), web, hume ethics, kant, niz etc.
finish web notes �
railton, korsgaard, williams
considering looking
at williams
consider looking at
hume
objectivism
virtue ethics
free will
kant
hume
moral objectivism
kant
nietzsche
practical reason
conseqm